Juveniles are not Adults: Juveniles Should  be  Afforded Additional Safeguards for Custodial Interrogations by Meka, Fatime
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2015
Juveniles are not Adults: Juveniles Should be
Afforded Additional Safeguards for Custodial
Interrogations
Fatime Meka
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Meka, Fatime, "Juveniles are not Adults: Juveniles Should be Afforded Additional Safeguards for Custodial Interrogations" (2015).
Law School Student Scholarship. 812.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/812
  Fatime Meka 
  Final Draft 
 2 
 
 
JUVENILES ARE NOT ADULTS: JUVENILES SHOULD BE AFFORDED ADDITIONAL 
SAFEGUARDS FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS. 
 
I. Introduction: 
 “It’s like I have this overwhelming feeling that I killed her.  I don’t know why, but I feel 
that way. [...] All I know is just for some reason, I can tell I killed her.”1  This juvenile confessed 
to the murder of his sister, when eventually DNA evidence revealed he did not in fact kill her.  It 
was a false confession.2  Why would a juvenile falsely confess to such a serious crime with such 
serious consequences?  He was somehow really convinced he did it.  He began his interrogation, 
however, with the mindset that he was not responsible for the murder of his sister, but after hours 
of being in the interrogation process he began to be overwhelmed with a feeling that he killed his 
sister.  He had the overwhelming feeling that he was responsible for the act, but he simply 
couldn’t remember the details of the event, just the fact that he believed he killed her because he 
was made to believe he killed her and that there was evidence that pointed to him.3  So, he 
confessed to the act of murder.  Where is the root of the problem with all of this?  Custodial 
interrogations.  
                                                 
1 Sauer, Mark; Wilkens, John, "Haunting questions: The Stephanie Crowe Murder Case. Part 1: The night 
she was killed;" "Part 2: The arrest.” San Diego Union Tribune (May 11, 1999); “Miscarriages/Travesty 
of Justice Michael Crowe Case Coerced Confession.” Youtube, LLC. Web. Nov. 4, 
2014.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= yJcqjPxtIXc. (Quotes by Michael Crowe on the murder of his 
sister Stephanie Crowe during his video taped custodial interrogation, including an apology letter he 
wrote to his sister as part of that interrogation). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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 The United States has a vast inconsistency when it comes to procedures for custodial 
interrogations and especially when it comes to those procedures for juveniles.  Also, there are 
separate procedures at the federal level for when a juvenile is a suspect of a federal violation.  
Subsequently, there is an array of procedures that differ from state to state for nonfederal 
violations.  Even with some procedures in place, the federal and state systems still lack specific 
procedures for how such custodial interrogations should be conducted specifically towards 
juveniles.   
 In this note I will start by discussing some of the seminal United States Supreme Court 
cases to illustrate the foundational pieces for custodial interrogations generally, as well as in 
regards to juveniles.  My illustration will include a break down of what custody is and when it is 
established, and what a waiver of rights is and when a waiver is sufficiently established, all with 
regards to custodial interrogations.  This note will not delve into the third piece of custodial 
interrogations, about how to establish what an interrogation is; the courts have not spoken on that 
as of yet in order to expand on it.  The courts have, however, spoken on custody and waiver.  
After I establish those foundational pieces, I will go through some of the current federal police 
standards for custodial interrogations enacted by statute and then I will illustrate New Jersey and 
New York’s juvenile systems and procedures for custodial interrogation through a comparative 
analysis, in order to show how two states that are similarly situated have such different treatment 
in juvenile procedures.  Next, I will provide a brief analysis of state police manuals currently in 
place for interrogations. The final part of my paper will propose a number of different safeguards 
in juvenile procedures that can help ensure juvenile rights during custodial interrogations.  
Ultimately, this note will show how the courts have taken some steps towards recognizing 
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differences between juveniles and adults, but how those efforts are not nearly enough and the 
courts should expand that recognition to follow through to custodial interrogations as well. 
 A juvenile is defined as a young person who is not old enough to be legally considered an 
adult as well as one reflecting psychological or intellectual immaturity. 4  Some synonyms 
provided for a juvenile include immature and young and some antonyms include adult and 
matured. 5  In the contrary, an adult is defined as one who is fully grown and developed. 6  
Furthermore, a child is defined as “one strongly influenced by another or by a place or state of 
affairs.”7  Simply by reading the clear and unambiguous definitions of what a juvenile or child 
means compared to what an adult means is alone a sufficient indicator that treatment of each 
should not be alike.  One who, by definition, is generally easily influenced should not be treated 
similarly to one who, by definition, is mature and developed, especially during custodial 
interrogations when the possible waiver of fundamental constitutional rights is involved.  As a 
matter of good sub-constitutional policy in protecting juvenile rights, jurisdictions across the 
country should uniformly adopt special procedural safeguards for juvenile treatment during 
custodial interrogations.  
 
II. Constitutional Law of Interrogations 
 This section will demonstrate the various constitutional laws and cases on custodial 
interrogation.  That being said, it will first illustrate the two main United States Constitutional 
Amendments involved, the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment.  Second, it will focus 
on case law that illustrates how “custody” is established, along with certain rights that attach, and 
                                                 
4 "Juvenile" Def. 1. Merriam Webster Online, Merriam Webster, n.d. Web. 4 Nov. 2014. 
5 Juvenile" Def. 2. Merriam Webster Online, Merriam Webster, n.d. Web. 4 Nov. 2014. 
6 “Adult” Def. 1. Merriam Webster Online, Merriam Webster, n.d. Web. 4 Nov. 2014. 
7 “Child" Def. 5. Merriam Webster Online, Merriam Webster, n.d. Web. 4 Nov. 2014. 
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then lastly this section will focus on the “waiver” of rights for custodial interrogation purposes. 
The section will not go into detail about “interrogations” on a constitutional level because the 
courts have not spoken on it yet, but the courts have spoken on custody and waiver.   Essentially, 
the purpose of this section is to outline where constitutional law currently stands with regards to 
juveniles. 
 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that no person “shall be 
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,” thus protecting a person from self-
incrimination.8  The Fifth Amendment was interpreted to apply to juveniles as well. 9   It was 
applied as a fundamental right to juveniles even though it was also recognized that juvenile 
proceedings were somewhat different than adult proceedings, taking place in family co urt.10 
Juvenile proceedings are somewhat different because some juvenile matters are looked at as 
criminal matters for the cases that lead to adjudicated dispositions of commitment in a state 
institution, but in the alternative some juvenile matters are seen as civil, and juveniles are still 
nonetheless afforded this privilege against self-incrimination. 11  
 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [...] to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.”12  The right to counsel is also a privilege afforded to adults as well as juveniles.  Both 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments have been incorporated into the States pursuant to the 
                                                 
8 U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
9 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
10 Id. at 4.  
11 Id. at 47,55; shows how special carve outs are made throughout the system to afford juveniles 
privileges that adults are afforded, while also taking into consideration the very fact that the person 
involved in the matter is a juvenile. 
12 U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
  Fatime Meka 
  Final Draft 
 6 
Fourteenth Amendment and the two Amendments are both key rights that the courts have 
focused on when discussing custodial interrogations.13 
 More than forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark 
interrogation case, Miranda v. Arizona.14  The Court held that certain constitutional rights attach 
when a person is taken into custody. 15   The test for when a person is considered to be in 
“custody” is an objective one, questioning whether the person was “deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way” by the police, so as to make a reasonable person believe he is not 
free to leave. 16   Hence, if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, as in the 
aforementioned situation, custody is likely to be established.  Furthermore, the Court indicated 
that custodial interrogations include a line of questioning towards a person in custody that is 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from that person. 17   In order to make a 
determination of custody, the Court looks at the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and 
decides whether under the circumstances a reasonable person would feel free to leave or not.18 
 Once custody is established, the Court held that “Miranda” rights attach and the 
following “Miranda Warnings” must be administered before any custodial interrogation begins: 
the person has the right to remain silent, anything he says can and will be used against him in a 
                                                 
13 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV 
14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
15 Id. (A man was taken to the police station and questioned for two hours without any advisement of his 
fundamental rights.  The Court was most concerned with coerced but true confessions violating a person’s 
right against self-incrimination rather than focusing on due process.  The Court found the coercion here to 
be more psychological and not at the level of coercion seen in earlier cases such as Brown v. Mississippi, 
297 U.S. 278 (1936) thereby avoiding due process. [In Brown v. Mississippi, police hung the suspect on a 
tree while questioning and kept hanging him and then letting him go before killing him.  The police used 
this as a method of custodial interrogation]).  
16 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444. 
17 Id. 445. 
18 Id. at 444. 
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court of law; the person has the right to an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will 
be provided to him if he so desires.19    
 The purpose of “Miranda Warnings” is to protect people from the Fifth Amendment 
Constitutional right against self- incrimination.20   The solution the Court provided in deciding 
Miranda serves as a layer of protection against coercive police interrogations, eliciting coerced 
confessions.  The Court stressed that “the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is 
psychologically rather physically orientated,” further noting that coercion does not necessarily 
solely mean physical, but mental as well. 21   Unfortunately, other than the issuance of the 
“Miranda Warnings” to notify a person in custody of his rights, the Court has provided little 
guidance as to what is permissible during the actual custodial interrogation as far as how they are 
conducted.22  The Court has taken time to illustrate the inherent coercive atmosphere and effect 
such interrogations possess, even on psychological levels, however, the Court has not identified 
where bright lines can be drawn here.  It does not leave any precedent as to what specific types 
of conduct and what process is in fact acceptable for police officers during custodial 
interrogations; the Court simply made carve outs of unacceptable behavior.23  
 In recent years, the seminal case JDB v. North Carolina was decided by the United States 
Supreme Court discussing the “custody” of juveniles for purposes of Miranda. 24   Justice 
Sotomayor emphasized that the history of the justice system is “replete with laws and juvenile 
                                                 
19 Id. at 444-445. 
20 Id. at 512. 
21 Id. at 437-438 
22 Id. 
23 Such as in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), with regard to the physical conduct of hanging 
the suspect during interrogations held as being unacceptable behavior for officers. 
24 JDB v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). (A thirteen-year-old juvenile was questioned by an 
officer in the presents of two officers and two administrators at school for an alleged burglary and the 
Court decided whether the age of the juvenile is a relevant factor for a custody analysis of a custodial 
interrogation.) 
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recognition that, children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults,” leaving no reason to 
take a different course in this case.25  The Court held that for the purpose of Miranda, objective 
custody analysis requires police to take a juvenile’s age into consideration, when the age is 
known to the officer or should have been known to the officer under an objective analysis,  when 
making the determination of whether and when “Miranda” rights must be issued to the 
juvenile.26 
 In reaching its decision, the Court reemphasized the “inherently compelling pressures” of 
police custodial interrogations as noted in Miranda, and even furthered that such pressures “can 
induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess crimes they never committed.”27  
The Court implicitly recognized a reasonable child versus a reasonable standard for adults by 
noting the common law approach in the Restatement of Torts, which embraces the reality that 
children are not adults thereby finding that a “person’s childhood is a relevant circumstance to be 
considered.”28 The Court acknowledges that children or juveniles sit in a different class than 
adults and noted that in general a juvenile may not even form a binding contract legally or get 
married without the consent of a parent.29   
 Ultimately, there are times that a juvenile needs the consent or the presents of an adult or 
guardian for certain areas in our judicial and legal system.   Furthermore, although the Court did 
not specifically carve out separate procedures for juveniles other than taking the “age” of a 
juvenile into consideration under the totality of the circumstances in making a determination for 
custody and issuance of Miranda rights within the already existent objective analysis, the Court 
                                                 
25 Id. at p. 2397, 2404, citing, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). (Internal quotes 
eliminated)(Emphasis added). 
26 JDB, supra, 131 S. Ct. at p. 2404.  
27 Id. at 2396-97, 2401, citing, Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303). 
28 JDB, supra, 131 S. Ct. at p. 2404, citing, Restatement (Third) of Torts § 10 Cmt. b, 117 (2005), see 
also, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A Cmt. b, 15 (1965). (Internal quotes eliminated). 
29 JDB, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 2403. 
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did recognize that “recent studies suggest that the risk is all the more acute when the subject of 
the custodial interrogation is a juvenile.” 30 
Accordingly, pursuant to the current standards set forth,  there is a two-step objective analysis for 
custody:31 
  1. What were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and 
  2. Given those circumstances would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty 
to end the interrogation and leave 
Some of the relevant factors examined under the circumstance surrounding the interrogation 
include: the location the questioning took place, the duration of the questioning, what statements  
were actually made during the interview, if there were any types of physical restraints apparent 
during the questioning or absent of such restraints during questions, and whether the person was 
actually released after the questioning ended. 32   As part of those circumstances objectively 
considered, for juveniles, the Court held that “age,” should be included in the circumstances, “so 
long as the child’s age was known to  the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have 
been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.”33  It can be argued that “age” can be seen an 
individual or personal characteristic of the juvenile making it a little less objective.  The Court 
here could not ignore the “very real differences between children and adults,” because to ignore 
such differences “would be to deny children the full scope of the procedural safeguards that 
Miranda guarantees to adults.”34  
 Subsequently, after custody is properly established and Miranda warnings are given, the 
person in custody has the right to waive his right to remain silent and his right to speak to an 
                                                 
30 Id. at 2397,2401.  
31 Id. at 2402 
32 Id. at 2402, see also, Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189-1190 (2012)). 
33 JDB, supra, 131 S. Ct. at p. 2406. 
34 Id. at p. 2405. 
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attorney or to have an attorney present.  The United States Supreme Court has illustrated that a 
sufficient waiver must be done so, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently by the person held in 
custody.35  In essence, voluntarily would be done without any coercive pressures, and knowingly 
and intelligently would mean the person is aware of the nature of the rights they are waiving and 
the consequences that subsequently follow.  In regards to public policy concerns, the Court was 
trying to strike a balance between the effectiveness of police questioning as well as the need to 
protect people from self- incrimination due to the inherently coercive nature of police 
interrogations generally.36  The Court decided in Miranda that: 
  “...Without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons 
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely.  In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self- incrimination, the accused must be 
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be 
fully honored.”37  
   
 If the person in custody indicates that he wants to invoke his right to remain silent or 
right to counsel, then the interrogation should cease at that point.38  If, however, the individual in 
custody is willing to make a statement and does not ask for an attorney, so long as it is done 
knowingly and voluntarily, it may constitute a waiver of those rights administered in the Miranda 
warning and the interrogation may commence.  The Court sets a high standard of proof for the 
waiver of constitutional rights, including those formerly mentioned in relation to custodial 
interrogations, which need to be proven by the State or government to show the sufficiency of a 
waiver.  The Court illustrated in Miranda that “any evidence that the accused was threatened, 
                                                 
35 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (Overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 
cert. den.) (Holding that a suspect's knowledge of an attorney's efforts to assist him by contacting the 
suspect or attempting to, was considered directly relevant to the suspect’s ability to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his Miranda rights).  
36 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 436.  
37 Id. at 457-58. 
38 Id.  
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tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily 
waive his privilege.”39  The aforementioned statement by the Court may be seen as one way the 
Court has attempted to draw some lines as to what types of behavior are perceived as coercive 
and not allowed by officers during custodial interrogations.  The administration of the Miranda 
warnings coupled with a sufficient waiver is generally seen as prerequisites to the admissibility 
of the statements made by the person in custody.   
 The Court has acknowledged that at times the person’s statement in custody can be 
somewhat ambiguous as to whether the suspect is actually trying to invoke his Miranda rights to 
remain silent and more so the right to counsel.40  Although not held as precedent, the Court did 
see it important to note that it would be “good police practice” for officers conducting 
interrogations, to ask some questions to clarify when it is unclear as to the person’s requests for 
counsel.41  This dicta shows that the Court can see some areas where the system in policing 
during custodial interrogations has room for improvements as good policy and for better police 
practice.42  Unfortunately, however, the Court did not take steps to elaborate on this so as to 
create any bright line rule for interrogations to be used for future purposes. 
 Further, it has been noted by the courts that silence alone does not constitute a waiver of 
Miranda.43  The waiver of Miranda may be said expressly or may be inferred by the actions or 
words by the individual held in custody.  The State or government must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that, based on the totality of the circumstances the person in 
custody understood his rights and knowingly and intelligently intended to waive those rights.44   
                                                 
39 Id. (Emphasis added) 
40 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475. 
44 Id. at 436. 
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 In the juvenile matter of Fare v. Michael C, the United States Supreme Court looked to 
Miranda in that, “if the accused  indicated in any matter that he wishes to remain silent or to 
consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and any statement obtained from him during 
interrogation thereafter may not be admitted against him at his trial.”45  While in custody, a 
juvenile had asked to speak with his probation officer after his Miranda warnings were 
administered. 46   His probation officer was not provided and the juvenile in turn eventually 
continued, by speaking with the police officer.47  Initially, the California lower court denied the 
juvenile’s motion to suppress those statements made, holding that the juvenile waived his right to 
remain silent.48  The California Supreme Court then, in turn, reversed the lower court, holding 
that the juvenile’s request for his probation officer should have been considered a “per se 
invocation” of his Constitutional Fifth Amendment right, in the same way that a person in 
custody may request for an attorney. 49   That court saw the probation officer as a “trusted 
guardian” in the juvenile’s life.50   
 The United States Supreme Court, however, ultimately overturned the California 
Supreme Court’s decision, reasoning, “A probation officer is not in a position to offer the type of 
legal assistance necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused undergoing 
custodial interrogation that a lawyer can offer.”51  The Court did, however, lay out some factors 
the courts should consider when assessing the totality of the circumstances of the sufficiency of a 
juveniles waiver including; age, education, experience, intelligence, background, understanding 
                                                 
45 Fare, 442 U.S. 707, 709 (1979), citing to, Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444-445, 473-474. 
46 Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 710. 
47 Id. at 710-712. 
48 Id. at 710-712. 
49 Id. 713-714 (Emphasis added).  
50 Id. at 713. 
51 Id. at 719-722.   
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of his Miranda rights, and understanding of the consequences that attach when agreeing to waive 
those rights, but still as an objective analysis.52  Accordingly, the Court held the age of a juvenile 
to merely be one of the many factors in a totality of the circumstances objective analysis of the 
situation at hand and not a dispositive one.  The system fails to give juveniles the protections 
they need, in terms of sufficiently waiving their Constitutional rights, because in general they 
“lack the psychosocial and cognitive maturity to consider the consequences of a waiver of rights 
or the ability to reason how to make this decision.”53 
 
III. Sub-Constitutional Regulations: 
 This section will illustrate legislative and local juvenile custodial interrogation 
regulations.  The first section will focus on the federal legislations, the second section will focus 
on state regulations specifically with a discussion on a comparative analysis of New Jersey and 
New York, and then the third section will briefly discuss current police training methods for 
conducting interrogations.   Generally, police officers have little guidance from the courts as to 
the appropriateness of custodial interrogations.  Very few rules are provided for the actual 
custodial interrogation, once warnings have been given.  Some hints were set forth in Brown v. 
Mississippi with regards to coercion that is at the level of physical violence, such as hanging the 
suspect, being held unacceptable and too coercive to allow for a “voluntary” confession. 54  The 
use of such force was an unacceptable measure taken by police, so the Court had to revoke the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 725.  
53 Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from 
Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 431, 431-32 
(2006), citing, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 478-79). 
54 Brown v. Mississippi, supra, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
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confession obtained.55  Even though Brown v. Mississippi deals with specific physical actions 
taken against a suspect while being questioned, the Court still failed to provide a definition for 
coercion that can be used in future cases as to what is permissible during custodial 
interrogations.56  Then in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that pursuant to certain rights found 
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the suspect in custody is afforded and needs to be read  those 
given rights as a warning prior to any custodial interrogation questioning and in order to ensure 
the suspect’s constitutional rights are protected.57  The Court in Miranda was concerned about 
the inherently coercive environment in a police dominant atmosphere, which is where the 
“Miranda Warnings” come into play.58  Again, these cases provided little guidance or any bright 
line rules as to what rules and procedures officers may use when conducting interrogations and 
in trying to obtain lawful confessions.  
 
A. Federal 
 This subsection illustrates the federal legislation set in place for juveniles.  The federal 
government has enacted a series of statutes for juveniles and in particular one statute that deals 
with appropriate procedures an officer should follow when juveniles are taken into custody for 
an alleged federal violation, prior to his appearance before a magistrate judge. 59  The statute 18 
                                                 
55 Id. at 278-280. (The police officers used physical force by tying the suspect from a tree and making it 
as though they were going to hang him, but letting him down before he actually died from it.  The 
eventually obtained a confession from the suspect.  The officers admitted to the tactics they used to obtain 
the confession and still held that the confession was indeed voluntary because the measures they used 
were seen as “legal” at the time.  The Court looked at the Constitution in holding that the suspect’s 
Constitutional rights were definitely violated by the measures taken). 
56 Brown v. Mississippi, supra, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  
57 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 436 (1966) 
58 Id. 
59 18 U.S.C.S. §5033 
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U.S.C.S. §503360 prescribes what general procedures to take place whenever a juvenile is taken 
into custody for a federal violation.  First, the juvenile should be advised his rights by the 
arresting officer immediately and those rights should be advised “in language comprehensive to a 
juvenile.”61 The legislature took the time to expressly carve out a need for juveniles to not only 
be read their legal rights (as in Miranda62), but to be read those rights in a way juveniles can 
understand those rights.  This extra requirement still kept the standards objective, however, by 
stating that the rights should be read in a language comprehensive to “a juvenile” instead of “the 
juvenile,” but it nonetheless is apparent that the legislature intends to illustrate a reasonable 
juvenile standard and that the treatment of juveniles in custody should be modified and tailored 
to juveniles specifically as opposed to using a general reasonable person standard for adults and 
juveniles alike.63   
 Furthermore, the statute states that the arresting officer needs to “immediately” notify the 
Attorney General and the juvenile’s parents, guardian, or custodian of the juvenile’s custody 
status as well as notify the parents, guardian, or custodian of the juvenile’s legal rights and nature 
of the alleged offense.64  The fact that the officer needs to notify parents or guardians and advise 
them of the juvenile’s situation and aforementioned rights, add itionally shows the legislatures 
intent to differentiate between adults and juveniles because unlike juveniles, adults do not have 
the need for their parents to be notified that they are taken into custody or of the adult suspect’s 
rights and alleged offense.  The status of merely being a juvenile automatically initiates such 
additional procedures for the arresting officer in order to assure the juvenile receives the same 
protection of rights as a similarly situated adult would receive for a federal violation.   
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. (Emphasis added). 
62 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 436 (1966).  
63 18 U.S.C.S. §5033 (Emphasis added). 
64 Id. 
  Fatime Meka 
  Final Draft 
 16 
 The federal system in the Eighth Circuit interpreted §5033 and held that the requirement 
for the officer to notify parents or guardians at the time of custody, is intended to be another 
safeguard insuring the juvenile’s basic rights to due process violations, as opposed to any 
constitutional rights or procedural rights such as to have the presents of a parent for a valid 
confession of the juvenile, holding that juveniles are capable of waiving their own right to 
remain silent. 65   This reasoning, however, should be revisited because it appears to be self-
contradictory: juveniles are seen to need additional safeguards not afforded to adults in order to 
protect rights like due process, yet at the same time, juveniles are seen to be fully capable of 
waiving a right to remain silent without such additional safeguards.   
 In another district court case, however, the Ninth Circuit illustrated that when the 
arresting officer informs the juvenile’s parents that the juvenile is in custody, pursuant to 
§503366, the officer must also inform the parents that they will have the opportunity to guide 
their child before any custodial interrogation. 67  Additionally, in another district court case, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a juvenile is entitled to the procedural protections under §5033 even if the 
age of the juvenile was not available at the time of the arrest or even if the juvenile gave an adult 
birth date to the officer at the time of the arrest. 68  This standard differs from the Court’s decision 
in JDB v. North Carolina, where it held that age was a fact to consider in the evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the interrogation, so long as the age was apparent at the time the juvenile was in 
custody or, if under an objective analysis a reasonable officer should have been aware of the 
                                                 
65 United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409 (8th Circuit, 1982). (The juvenile accused of the rape of a 
teacher was looked at as a juvenile delinquent within the meaning of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency 
Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §5033.) 
66 18 U.S.C.S. §5033. 
67 United States v. Female Juvenile, 255 F3d 761, 762, 766-767 (9th Cir. Cal. 2001). 
68 United States v. Juvenile Male, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1686, 37-38, 61-62 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010). 
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age.69  As a general blanket, however, the United States Supreme Court has held that Miranda is 
a constitutional rule that governs the admissibility of statement derived from custodial 
interrogations at both the state and federal level and cannot be superseded legislatively.70  The 
states have accordingly used Miranda as a foundation and floor for such proceedings, but still 
establish their own nuances they see fit to add layers to the state’s juvenile justice system.   
 
B. New Jersey and New York Comparison  
 The police standards for custodial interrogations vary from State to State.  The standards 
differ as to the treatment of adults and whether or not the State recognizes special standards for 
juveniles.  It is helpful to see how some states vary in general when it comes to the treatment of 
juveniles with regards to custody, Miranda warnings, and custodial interrogations.  This 
subsection includes a comparative analysis of two bordering states, New Jersey and New York.  
The subsection will show how their two systems vary in treatment for juvenile procedures.   
 In New Jersey, the courts have recognized some differences in treatment that needs to be 
afforded specifically to juveniles with regards to “Miranda Warnings.”71  The warnings must be 
administered, but the analysis for a juvenile is whether, during the custodial interrogation, the 
juvenile was “treated with the utmost fairness and with every consideration that his age and all 
surrounding circumstances indicated should be accorded to him.”72  Also, if the juvenile “is not 
old enough to understand and waive, and the parents cannot be found or cannot or will not 
attend, [the court held] that the questioning may go forward, even without the Miranda 
warnings”; New Jersey allows for the questioning to continue if it is “conducted with the utmost 
                                                 
69 JDB, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 2406. 
70 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
71 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
72 State in the Interest of R.W., 115 N.J. Super. 286, 295 (App. Div. 1971), aff’d 61 N.J. 118 (1972); 
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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fairness, without force or other improper influence, mental or physical, and in accordance with 
the highest standards of due process and fundamental fairness.”73  The formerly listed statement 
can be seen as the State’s attempt to illustrate inappropriate conduct during interrogations and an 
attempt to eliminate the psychological tactics that officers often use to obtain confessions.  New 
Jersey clearly affords juveniles a higher level of protection during custodial interrogation 
because of the juveniles very nature of being more susceptible to the psychological tactics 
officers use, noting that the officers conducting the interrogations are not only adults but also in 
positions of authority.74 
 Furthermore, in New Jersey the police officer should make reasonable efforts to contact 
the juvenile’s parents or guardian and should have them present during any juvenile custodial 
interrogations because of the inherently coercive nature of the questions and the juvenile’s 
susceptibility to psychological coercion more easily than a similarly situated adult. 75  New Jersey 
finds that the presents of a parent during the interrogation process not only protects the interest of 
the juvenile, but also serves as a protection for the truthfulness of the statements made by the 
juvenile.76 Also, interestingly, New Jersey requires that the state prove the voluntariness of a 
waiver by the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, not just by a preponderance of the 
evidence.77 
 Comparatively, in New York, the juvenile must notified his Miranda rights, but a parent 
or guardian is not seen as necessary during a custodial interrogation. 78  The State has held that a 
juvenile is capable of voluntarily making a confession without the need of a parent, guardian, or 
                                                 
73 State in the Interest of R.W., 115 N.J. Super. at 296.  
74 State in the Interest of B.T., 145 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1976) cert. denied 73 N.J. 49 (1977). 
75 State in the Interest of J.P.B., 143 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 1976).  
76 State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1113-1114 (N.J. 2000).   
77 State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993). 
78 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 305.2(7). 
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counsel.79  The parents or guardians simply need to be notified that the juvenile is in custody and 
also be notified of the juvenile’s Miranda rights.80  Further, when determining whether a juvenile 
has made a valid waiver, New York’s system is less protective than New Jersey’s long list of 
considerations in regards to juveniles specifically.  The State allows for a parent or other adults 
that are “close blood relatives, whose protective relationship with children our society has also 
traditionally respected, as well as non-related adults whose functional relationship with the child 
is equally close,” to waive their child’s rights even without the juvenile’s consent. 81  It seems a 
bit counterintuitive, however, since on the one hand a juvenile is allowed to waive his own rights 
without the presents of a parent, so long as one is notified of the juvenile’s rights, but on the 
other hand the parent can step in an waive those said rights even without the juvenile consenting 
to that waiver. New York simply looks at the totality of the circumstances, while taking the age 
into consideration as one of the factors, but still not as protective as New Jersey with the “utmost 
fairness” analysis.  These two State are similarly situated, yet there are clear distinctions and 
variations as far as how juveniles are treated for purposes of custodial interrogations and the 
juvenile’s Miranda rights.  
 
C. Current Police Training  
 Additionally, at the state level, police are given training manuals that include variations 
of interrogation techniques.  This subsection will step away from the legal requirements and 
illustrate some of the most commonly used police training techniques for interrogations in order 
to show the types of measures taken and the psychological impacts such methods have on 
                                                 
79 Id. at 305.2(3),(7); People v. Stephen J.B., 23 N.Y. 2d 611 (1969). 
80 Id.  
81 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 305.2(7)-(8); In re Abraham R., 2009 WL 750179, quoting, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 
292, 310 (1993).  
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suspects. Most police training manuals across the United States merely provide general 
interrogation techniques that may be used.  Although there is some commonly recognized 
methods, there is still a lack of uniformity throughout the country on conducting custodial 
interrogations.  
 The manuals, however, typically try to show different methods an officer can use to break 
down the person in custody’s resistance to speak. 82  The officers are seeking confessions and 
possibly further investigatory leads or evidence.  The psychological tactics for interrogation 
focus on the influence of persuasion because often a person in custody is at first reluctant to 
speak with the officers. 83   Officers attempt to use the art of persuasion during custodial 
interrogations in order to convince the person in custody that it is in his best interest to speak 
with the officer and confess.84  The manuals include a variety of deceptive strategies the o fficer’s 
may choose to utilize during interrogations.  Some techniques include trickery, misrepresentation 
of the seriousness of the crime, exaggerating the strength of the evidence against the person at 
that time, or creating the psychological idea that confessing leads to leniency without outright 
making any promises or stating that leniency will be given if a confession is made.85   
 As previously stated, the Court held that “any evidence that the accused was threatened, 
tricked, or cajoled into waiver” essentially effects the voluntariness of a waiver. 86  Yet, police 
manuals allow for “trickery” and “deception,” but it is very hard to tell where the thin line is 
drawn to go from acceptable trickery or deception to the area of unacceptable psychological 
force or coercion. Additionally, different methods as to the environment the interrogation is 
                                                 
82 G. H. Gudjonsson. "The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook.” Applied 
Cognitive Psychology. (2003)(Referencing the Reid Technique).  
83 Id. at p. 8.  
84 Id. 
85 Id. at p. 11-12. 
86 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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given in, the type of seat the person is custody sits in, the person’s position in the room in 
relation to the officer or officers present at the time, the size of the room, whether the room has 
windows, a mirror, or other physical methods based on the initial environment the suspect walks 
into that tends to make the situation the suspect is in, uncomfortable from the outset.87 
 A popular interrogation method, well known throughout the United States, is the Reid 
method that includes nine steps of different ways to psychologically manipulate the suspect into 
a confession.88 The nine steps are as follows: direct positive confrontation, theme development, 
handling denials, overcoming objections, getting the suspect’s attention, handling the suspect’s 
passive mood, presenting an alternative question, having the suspect orally relate some of the 
details of the alleged offense, obtaining a confession and converting that confession into a 
written confession.89  These steps recognize that, naturally, most people are reluctant to confess 
and therefore are likely to make denials.  This is seen as a problem for officers, especially if the 
person makes repeated denials because it starts to give the person in custody a psychological 
advantage, so the officer in step three is suppose to interrupt the suspect from those continued 
denials.90  These steps are all essentially about overcoming the person in custody psychologically 
by bringing him down and making him feel like he doesn’t have much “power.”  The 
justification the manual uses for setting forth such techniques is that an innocent suspect with an 
average level of intelligence would not acknowledge committing a crime just because the officer 
                                                 
87 G. H. Gudjonsson. "The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook.” Applied 
Cognitive Psychology. (2003); Reid, John. The Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation - 
Training Seminars & More. 4 Nov. 2014. http://www.reid.com.  
88 Id. at 10. 
89 Id. at 17-20; see also, Zulawski, David E.; Wicklander, Douglas E., Practical Aspects of Interview and 
Interrogation. Ann Arbor: CRC Press. (2001).  
90 Id. at p. 17. 
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provided two alternatives to how or why the crime was committed and encourage to accept one 
of them.91  
 In regards to juveniles, officers do not usually get a separate manual for those custodial 
interrogations, which is appalling since even the United States Supreme Court made some efforts 
to recognize that children should not be viewed as miniature adults. 92   These psychological 
tactics are ones that are used throughout the system.  Juveniles need to be protected.  
 
IV. Recommendations.  
 The following section provides some of my recommendations for juvenile procedures 
and the section shows how the following safeguards can ensure juveniles’ rights are protected 
during the custodial interrogation process.  First and foremost, all juvenile interrogations should 
be video taped and recorded beginning from the moments leading up to the juvenile entering the 
room.  Additionally, regardless of the juveniles age, a parent or guardian should definitely be 
notified and read the juvenile’s Miranda rights in addition to the juvenile.  In the event that a 
parent or guardian is unable to be located after reasonable efforts by the officers, then the 
officers may proceed by inquiring whether the juvenile has another adult he looks at as a “trusted 
guardian” and attempt to contact that person if anyone shall be named.  Otherwise, if no one can 
be located after diligent reasonable efforts, then the process can proceed without a parent or 
guardian present, but it should be treated with the utmost fairness and with every consideration 
that the juvenile’s age in mind as well as any surrounding circumstances.  Additionally, it would 
be valuable to the efficiency of the process if counsel were nonetheless notified and the juvenile 
                                                 
91 Id. at p. 20. 
92 JDB, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 2404. 
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provided the opportunity to consult with that counsel after the officer issued him his Miranda 
rights and before the commencement of questioning for any custodial interrogations.  
 Then, after such consultation the juvenile can be presumed to be in a much better position 
to understand his Miranda rights, so then the juvenile can make an informed decision and decide 
whether to waive his Miranda rights or not and how he wishes to proceed with the custodial 
interrogation.  In the event that the juvenile decides to “knowingly” waive his Miranda rights and 
continue with the questioning, the juvenile should be afforded the right to decide if he would like 
to be questioned; with counsel present, without counsel present, with just a parent or guardian 
present, or with both counsel and a parent or guardian present.  It is the most important for 
counsel to be present initially in the process because what occurs in many cases is that officers 
convince the juveniles that it is in their best interest to speak with the officers at this point in the 
proceeding and that any counsel that would be provided works together with the government; as 
in the public defenders and prosecutors are both considered government positions.  These 
techniques usually instill hesitance in the juvenile to consult with such counsel.  The juvenile is 
placed in a position where he thinks it is in his best interest to speak with the police officer and 
not such counsel that could be provided.  Based on personal experience in working with 
juveniles for purposes of detention hearings, they often seem unwilling to speak freely with their 
represented counsel at first due to such factors that are instilled in their more-or-less innocent, 
developing minds.   
 Continuing with the proposed process, during the actual custodial interrogation, the 
officer should not be allowed to use psychological tactics to try and trick the juveniles; they 
should be more forthcoming with what the alleged crime is and in letting the juvenile know that 
if he chooses not to speak to the police officers it cannot be held against him.  It appears okay for 
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the officer to even continue at this point by informing the juvenile that if the juvenile does 
choose to speak with them it will assist the officers in their investigation for the alleged crime, 
but it should definitely be made clear, even further than simply reading their Miranda rights, that 
it is completely okay for them not to speak to the officers for a custodial interrogation and they 
will not suffer any harsher consequences for the alleged crime, simply for choosing not to speak. 
Similar to New Jersey’s treatment of young juveniles who are unable to consent, it would be 
beneficial that for all juvenile questioning the officers conduct the interrogations with the utmost 
fairness, without force or other improper influence, mental or physical, and in accordance with 
the highest standards of due process and fundamental fairness.  The position in this note is that 
these proposed recommendations for safeguards during juvenile procedures will allow for the 
additional protections that juveniles needs to be afforded in order to not only protect their 
constitutional rights, but to also allow for further transparency and efficiency within the judicial 
system as a whole. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 Over 20 years after the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona93; five male juveniles were 
charged and convicted for the brutal rape of a female jogger in Central Park in 1989.94  These 
five juveniles were known as, the “Central Park Five.”95  The juveniles ranged from fourteen to 
sixteen years of age.  Four of them were charged as juveniles and one was charged as an adult.96  
Their sentences ranged from six years to thirteen years in confinement for the crime.97  The State 
had confessions from four of those juveniles, which were received during their custodial 
                                                 
93 Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 436. 
94 The Central Park Five. 2012. Documentary. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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interrogations.98  Their constitutional rights were read to them.99  Some of juveniles even had 
their parents present during the questioning.100  During trial, it was difficult for the prosecution to 
connect any of the other evidence to those five juveniles.101  None of the juveniles’ DNA was 
found on the scene or on the victim or her clothing, but those confessions were there, and were 
video recorded.102  Those confessions were used at trial to prosecute the juveniles. 103  Before the 
end of the proceedings, one of the defense attorneys approached the juveniles as to a possible 
plea deal if three of them plead guilty. 104   The juveniles’ refused to take a plea deal and 
maintained their innocence, even with their “confessions” out in public. 105  At trial, after a long 
deliberation, guilty verdicts were returned for all of the juveniles and they were sentenced 
accordingly.106 
 Then, over ten years later, a man stepped forward.107  A man who was known as a serial 
rapist stepped up and admitted to being the sole assailant of the rape of the female jogger in 
Central Park on the April night in 1989.108  There was DNA evidence that corroborated that man 
with the DNA at the scene of the incident in 1989. 109  Notwithstanding, about ten years prior, the 
State obtained elaborate and detailed confessions from those five juveniles, admitting and 
recording on video, that they collectively committed the crime.  Their Miranda warnings were 
given, most if not all of their parents were present during the interrogation and again read the 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
  Fatime Meka 
  Final Draft 
 26 
Miranda warnings, and still, the innocent juveniles falsely confessed.  It can be argued that they 
all falsely confessed due to the inherently coercive nature of such custodial interrogations 
particularly when minors are involved.  It does not mean that the officers conducting the 
interrogations used unlawful techniques according to the minimal legal principles set in the area 
of law, but somehow, during these interrogations, the juveniles were convinced that confessing, 
albeit falsely, was in their best interest.  The “Central Park Five” were eventually exonerated, but 
unfortunately so was their youth.110   
 Shortly thereafter, a large number of the States across the country began requiring that 
custodial interrogations be recorded in order to have an additional safeguard in the reviewing 
process and in hopes of creating some more transparency within the system.  How much has the 
system really changed since then in regards to juvenile interrogations? Other than recognizing 
that juveniles are not in fact adults, but at the same time, somehow juveniles are not afforded 
their own nationwide standards recognizing that fact for the inherent compelling nature of 
custodial interrogations. 
 Additionally, there seems to be this misperception that there is an increasing number of 
juvenile crimes.  There is little consideration, however, that maybe some of that increase in 
number may be due to wrongful confessions that were either false confessions or truthful but 
coerced confessions due to the inherently coercive nature of such interrogations coupled with the 
inherent lack of maturity of juveniles.  There should be a presumption that juvenile confessions 
made during custodial interrogation are done so involuntarily because of the juvenile’s 
fundamental rights being “unknowingly” and “unintelligently” waived.  In the current stance of 
the system, it is very unlikely to think that juveniles can ever really “knowingly” understand and 
                                                 
110 Id. 
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comprehend their rights, or what they are doing by waiving them, or the consequences their 
decision may have, without any further safeguards.   
 The system seems to be driving away from the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile 
proceedings.  The United States Supreme Court in Miranda has already stated that custodial 
interrogations are inherently coercive in nature.  So, that inherent coerciveness, coupled with the 
inherent lack of maturity of juveniles, should afford for more standards for juveniles in order to 
form the necessary additional safeguards.  Ultimately, the justice system has taken efforts to 
recognize differences between adults and juveniles due to their age and development, but the 
system cannot stop in its current state because it is falling short in protecting the youth of our 
country.  
